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Practice Academy / Treasury & spend controls

Cash visibility is not payment authority.

Understand what the practice can afford, who may commit it, and how a payment becomes a verified record.

Executive summary. A practice can have a useful cash forecast and still have a weak payment process. Forecasting supports a decision; it does not authorize a purchase, verify a recipient, or prove that money reached the right account. This lesson separates those questions and provides an illustrative control map for discussing responsibilities with your accountant, financial institution, and management team. It also explains why a familiar email thread is not enough evidence for a bank-account change. The aim is neither to add an approval to every trivial task nor to concentrate every decision in the physician owner. It is to assign proportionate authority, preserve evidence, and make exceptions visible before they become accepted habits.

Learning outcomes: distinguish liquidity planning from authorization; map a payment’s decision points; identify a verification gap without treating every discrepancy as fraud.

Preparation: Financial statements · Estimated reading time: 10 minutes · Prepared November 15, 2026.

Four different questions.

A budget describes intended activity. A short-horizon cash forecast organizes expected receipts and payments by timing. An approval establishes that an authorized person accepted a specific commitment within their authority. Reconciliation compares records and investigates differences. None substitutes for all the others.

For example, an approved equipment purchase can still be directed to an incorrect recipient. A legitimate invoice can still arrive when cash is insufficient. A bank debit can still be recorded against the wrong expense. Asking which question failed is more useful than saying the entire finance process failed.

Use a framework without overstating its authority.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO, 2025) Green Book addresses internal control in federal agencies. Its separation of authority, custody, and accounting is a useful design principle to discuss in a private practice, not a claim that every practice must implement the federal framework. When full segregation is impractical, GAO describes alternative controls to address the risk. The practice-specific application below is an educational example, not a mandated control checklist.

Design the handoffs before granting access.

Illustrative responsibility map for discussion, not a delegation of authority
CheckpointEvidence to retainQuestion for the owner
RequestBusiness purpose, proposed supplier, scope, price and timingWho can request spending without committing the practice?
ApproveIdentified approver, amount, conditions and approval timeWhat are the limits, and who approves exceptions?
Set up or change payeeIndependently verified instructions and change recordCan the requester also change the destination without review?
ReleasePayment reference and evidence of required release authorizationWho has actual bank-system authority?
Record and reconcileInvoice, accounting entry, settlement evidence and resolved differencesWho reviews activity they did not initiate?

A role label is not the same as a technical permission. Compare the written approval matrix with the permissions actually configured in purchasing, accounting, and banking systems. Discuss thresholds, emergency exceptions, absence coverage, and retained evidence with qualified advisors. Avoid universal dollar limits: the right design depends on the organization and its risks.

In a small practice, one person may perform several tasks. Document the overlap rather than pretending it is absent. An independent review may help, but a signature without access to supporting records is not meaningful challenge. Decide what the reviewer checks, how promptly, and how unresolved items are escalated.

A changed bank account deserves a separate check.

Business email compromise can use messages that appear to come from a known source. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, n.d.) recommends verifying payment requests and account changes, using an independently located contact rather than information supplied in a suspicious message, and treating urgency cautiously. Authentication protects an account, but a recognizable sender or convincing thread is not proof that the requested destination is valid.

Fictional teaching example

The invoice is real. The new destination may not be.

A practice expects an $18,000 equipment invoice. A message in an apparently familiar conversation asks for payment to a replacement bank account before the afternoon cutoff. The purchase was approved last week.

The prior approval answers the purchase question, not the destination-change question. Under the practice’s established process, the designated employee pauses the change and verifies it through an independently established vendor contact. The authorized approver then evaluates the documented outcome. No conclusion about fraud should be drawn merely from the existence of a change request.

If a suspicious transfer has already occurred, the FBI advises contacting the financial institution immediately and reporting to the Internet Crime Complaint Center. Follow the organization’s incident process and involve the appropriate banking, security, and legal contacts; recovery is not guaranteed (FBI, n.d.).

Make the cash discussion explicit.

A useful review distinguishes actual available cash from expected collections and proposed spending. Identify dated obligations, uncertain receipts, restrictions, and commitments not yet paid. Keep a baseline and a downside case rather than silently changing assumptions to make the ending balance comfortable.

Fictional one-week bridge

Opening cash of $85,000 + expected receipts of $32,000 − planned payments of $48,000 = projected closing cash of $69,000. If $20,000 of those receipts moves into the following week, the same bridge ends at $49,000.

This arithmetic is not a recommendation to defer payroll, taxes, patient-related obligations, or contracted payments. It also excludes any unlisted restrictions and obligations. The decision owner must evaluate actual commitments and lawful options with the appropriate advisors.

Compare forecast with actual results by cause: timing, amount, missing obligation, or data error. The purpose is to improve visibility, not to manufacture a precise prediction. A model can inform an approval conversation without conferring authority to move money.

Knowledge check: does an accurate forecast make a payment safe?

No. It may support the liquidity question, but does not establish spending authority, recipient legitimacy, correct bank permissions, or accurate recording. Each needs its own evidence.

Bring these questions to your next review.

  • Which person can create a supplier, alter its bank details, approve an invoice, and release funds? Where do roles overlap?
  • How are urgent requests handled without bypassing independent verification?
  • What evidence proves a review happened, and what happens to unresolved differences?
  • Which obligations are missing from the cash forecast because they have not yet produced an invoice?
  • Who maintains the authority matrix when people, vendors, or systems change?

Where MedCBO fits: administrative coordination and reporting support, when included in the signed scope, should make responsibilities clearer. This lesson does not grant MedCBO bank access, custody, unilateral payment authority, or authority to make owner, accounting, tax, or legal decisions. Actual services and permissions require a defined agreement and appropriate controls.

Continue with KPI governance, vendor handoffs, or security and continuity.

Applied decision lab / Retained legacy learning depth

When a small team cannot separate every role.

This fictional exercise adapts the existing internal-controls guide. It applies the control-design principle discussed above; it is not an audit conclusion or a mandatory staffing model (GAO, 2025).

One person can complete the entire payment chain.

A four-person practice lets its office manager create suppliers, change payment details, release funds, record expenses and reconcile the bank. The physician reviews the monthly income statement but receives no bank statement or exception report directly.

The design creates a concentration of authority. It does not establish that the manager has done anything wrong. A useful response is to identify which steps can be independently approved or reviewed, which source evidence reaches that reviewer, and how exceptions are resolved. An income statement alone cannot establish that a particular payee change or payment was authorized.

Defend the decision.

1. Would adding a signature to the monthly report solve the problem?

Not by itself. Define what the reviewer compares: approved obligations, independently obtained banking evidence, payment destinations, accounting records and unresolved differences. A signature documents little if the reviewer cannot examine the underlying transaction.

2. What if the team cannot hire another employee?

Map the incompatible duties and discuss proportionate compensating controls with the owner, bank and qualified accountant. Options may include independent review of vendor changes, appropriate release approval and direct access to bank evidence. The design depends on actual permissions and risk; the lesson does not prescribe one universal workflow.

3. Does a discrepancy justify accusing an employee of fraud?

No. Record the discrepancy, preserve relevant evidence, investigate fairly and involve appropriate professionals. Timing, error and incomplete records can also explain differences. Escalation should follow facts and the established process, not an assumption about intent.

Keep a decision record, not just a policy.

  1. Risk and population: identify payments, payee changes, payroll changes, refunds or adjustments covered by the review.
  2. Authority: name who requests, approves, changes access, releases, records and reconciles. Identify overlap explicitly.
  3. Evidence: state which independent records the reviewer receives and how they compare them.
  4. Cadence and coverage: specify timing, absence coverage and what happens when a review is late.
  5. Exceptions: record the question, responsible owner, resolution and any corrective action without treating an exception as proof of misconduct.
  6. Change triggers: revisit the design after staffing, banking, system or vendor changes.

Keep the separate operating-budget and cash-flow lesson for liquidity forecasting. Its question is when cash is available; this control lesson asks who may commit it and what evidence supports the transaction. The topics should connect, not collapse into one page.

References & evidence notes

This lesson uses primary government guidance for control design and fraud prevention. The process map and numerical examples are original educational illustrations, not research findings or a tested fraud-prevention program. Legal duties and banking arrangements vary; obtain advice for your circumstances.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). Business email compromise. Read the FBI guidance.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2025, May 15). Standards for internal control in the federal government (GAO-25-107721; Principle 10, paras. 10.21–10.23, p. 73). Read the Green Book.

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